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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY LINES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

CASE
NO. 8654

SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff has seen fit to limit its Satement of Facts
substantially to the allegations in its complaint. There
is no attempt whatever to state the facts appearing in
defendant's answer, which are also deemed admitted
in this proceeding. We believe it essential to a proper
approach to the issues here involved to state the facts
revealed by the answer.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Prior to April 25, 1944, the Utah Light and Traction
Company held a franchise to operate electric street cars
and trolley buses over certain streets in Salt Lake City.
On that date the traction company and plaintiff petitioned the city to approve the transfer of the franchise
to plaintiff. An ordinance was adopted approving the
transfer. It provided that plaintiff had the right to
operate "a comprehensive transportation system upon
and over the streets of Salt Lake City, including electric
car.s, electric trolley coaches and rnotor buses." It further
provided for the payment annually of "a license tax of
1f2 of 1% of the gross passenger revenue derived from
operations within the City of electric street cars, trolley
coaches and motor buses." The franchise so granted was
to run until July 1, 1955 and was aceepted by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, since 1947, ha.s operated only motor
buses, but it continued to pay the license tax above referred to until the ordinance was adopted February 27,
1951, the one now under attack. At no time did plaintiff
contend that the franchise so granted was unnecessary
or became inoper.ative because it was operating only
motor buses, nor did it request cancellation. It did not
pay the license tax under protest, nor did it ever assert
that the license tax was not uniform or that it was discriminatory. We shall refer to the charge of a percentage
of the gross revenue as .a license tax for simplification
without attempting to define it as such a tax.
When the ordinance of February 27, 1951 was adop-
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ted, the plaintiff, through its proper officers, orally
consented and agreed to its passage and agreed to increasing the license tax from ¥2 of 1% to 2i% of the
gross revenue. This was agreed to and the ordinance
passed more than 4 years before the expiration date of
the 1944 franchise then in effect.
Plaintiff never at any time questioned the validity
of the 1951 ordinance or the tax so increased until this
.action was brought in 1956. On the contrary, plaintiff
has in all re.spects complied with the ordinance. It has
filed with the City Treasurer quarterly reports of gross
revenues, together with a computation of the tax to be
paid, and co-incidental therewith has paid, without protest, and without questioning the validity of the tax,
the .amount of the tax thus computed, and plaintiff has
permitted access to its records for verification, all as
provided for in the ordinance now attacked.
Under date of February 27, 1956, plaintiff petitioned
the governing body of Salt Lake City for a hearing
to discuss the matter of eliminating the license tax. A
he.aring was held and a new ordinance was passed amending the 1951 franchise by reducing the license tax from
2% to 1% for the year 1956. A copy of this amending
ordinance is attached to the Answer. Neither in its petition, nor in the hearing thereon, did plaintiff assert
that the 1951 ordinance was void or that the license
tax imposed thereby was invalid. Instead, plaintiff in
writing expressed appreciation to the City governing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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body for making the reduction, and plaintiff paid the
1% license tax for 1956 without protest or any claim
that either the original or amendatory ordinance ~r
license tax was invalid.
Under date of July 15, 1953, plaintiff filed with the
Public Service Commis.sion of Utah an application to
increase its fares. In such application it listed as an
item of expense, to show its need for increasing fares,
the license tax payable under the 1951 ordinance. At
the hearing on March 10, 1954, this item was discussed
and the Commission made inquiry from the City's Mayor
whether the City would forego this license tax, stating
that it was one of the elements of cost shown in the
tran.sportation company's operating cost. The City declined to forego and on :Jiarch 17, 1954 the plaintiff
was granted increases in its fares. In its decision the
Civil Service Commission refers to the 2% tax and to
wage increases as elen1ents in the expense figure. Plaintiff did not contend before the Public Service Commission that said tax was invalid, but, on the contrary,
relied upon such tax .as an iten1 of expense it was bound
to pay in justification for its application for a raise in
fares.
lTnder the 1951 ordinance, plaintiff is authorized
to operate double or single trark lines for electric street
raihvay, double or single trolley coach lines, n1otor bus0s
or any other ,systein of n1.ass transportation, all as it
may deter1nine. Consequently, it is free to use whatever
type of 1nass transportation it desires under this fran~
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5
chise.
The City has never regarded the franchise void
because of plaintiff's failure to accept it in writing, but
has a~ways insisted that the license tax thereunder 'Je
paid, except when it voluntarily eliminated % in 1956.
The city imposes a license fee upon automobiles, taxicabs, auto stages, trucks and other vehicles used for
business upon the streets of Salt Lake City but has not
required such license fee from plaintiff, and plaintiff
has been exempted from all taxes other than the 2%
license tax. By the express language of the ordinance
that tax is in lieu of all other taxes that the City might
impose.
1

Based upon the foregoing the City alleges that plaintiff has waived all objections to the validity of the ordinance and to the necessity of filing an acceptance thereof
and is estopped to claim said ordinance void and to rely
on its own wrong and failure in failing to give written
acceptance of the ordinance, while, nevertheless, proceeding with its mass transportation business under the
ordinance the same as if it had filed formal written
acceptance of said ordinance.

STATEJ\1:ENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE F AlLURE OF PLAINTIFF TO FILE WRITTEN
ACCEPTANCE OF THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 27,
1951, DID NOT RENDER IT NULL AND VOID.
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POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ALL OBJECTIONS TO
THE VALIDITY OF SAID ORDINANCE AND IS BOUND
BY ITS TERMS AND IS ESTOPPED TO QUESTION ITS
VALIDITY.
POINT III
BY IMPOSING THE LICENSE TAX UPON PLAINTIFF
BUT NOT UPON OTHER TYPES OF MOTOR CONVEYANCES THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND LACK OF UNIFORMITY
IN RESPECT TO CLASS AS CONTENDED BY PLAINTIFF.
POINT IV
SALT LAKE CITY HAS POWER TO LEVY THE FRANCHISE TAX IMPOSED BY SAID ORDINANCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE F AlLURE OF PLAINTIFF TO FILE WRITTEN
ACCEPTANCE OF THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 27,
1951, DID NOT RENDER IT NULL AND VOID.

Plaintiff is attempting to convert its failure to file
a written consent to the ordinance of February 27, 1951,
as the equivalent of a refusal to giYe such consent. Nowhere is there any inkling that a refusal to accept was
ever transmitted to the City, or that the City ever reg.arded such failure as the equivalent, or that the plaintiff ever regarded such failure as the equivalent, of a
refusal to accept. On the contrary both parties proceeded
at all times under the theory that the ordinance was
valid and that both were controlled in their relationship
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with each other by the terms thereof. The reports required by the ordinance were made, the gross receipts
given, the tax calculated and paid, and the books and
records of the plaintiff were open to the City for checking, all as required by the terms of the ordinance, for
six ye.ar.s before this action was commenced. Furthermore, as alleged in the answer, and admitted by plaintiff, plaintiff's officers consented and agreed, orally,
to the passage of this very ordinance and to the increase
in the license tax from ¥2 of 1% to 2% of the gross
revenue .as contained in said ordinance. The franchise,
being in the nature of a contract, there would be some
doubt as to the power of the City to change its terms
without the consent of the plaintiff. So to remove this
doubt the matter was discussed with plaintiff's officers.
In these discussions plaintiff never did que.stion the
validity of the license tax, but orally agreed to the increase, thus clearing the way for the change. In addition, for five years, plaintiff complied with the terms
of the ordinance and then petitioned for a reduction in
the tax for 1956. It expressed gratitude for such concession. It is apparent, therefore, that there was never
any refusal to accept the ordinance; that the lack of
a written acceptance was merely an oversight. To now
assert that such lack of written acceptance arose from
a refusal to .accept is an attempt now to create, after
the fact, something that had no actuality at the time
the ordinance was passed or during the 6 years since
its passage before this suit was commenced and is wholly
contrary to the attitude manifested by the plaintiff
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through its complete compliance with the terms of the
ordinance.
The authorities generally hold that a formal written
acceptance of the franchise ordinance, even though it
contains a provision that it shall be null and void without such .acceptance, is not necessary; that the City may
waive the written acceptance and acceptance may result
from the practical use of the franchise.

12 McQuillan Municipal Corp. Sec. 34.43, Page 150:
"Sometimes, however, an ordinance granting
a franchise requires the grantee to file his acceptance thereof. But where the grant of a franchise
requires an acceptance in writing, the municipality may waive .such acceptance, and the act
of the company in using the streets may be sufficient as an acceptance."
Postal Tel. Cable Co. vs. City of Newport, 76 S.W.
159, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 635.

Here the ordinance required acceptance in wTiting
within 30 days or the same should be null and void .and
of no effect. The plaintiff refused to pay the license
tax claiming it had not accepted the franchise and was
operating under the federal statute governing post roads.
The court .s.ays:
"The defendant entered on the streets soon
after the ordinance was passed and constructed
its system. It had no authority to do so, except
under the ordinance. Its acceptruwe was an acceptance of the ordinance in the .absence of some
expre.ssed disclain1er, which is not alleged. Its
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failure to accept the ordinance in writing might
be waived by the city, and this waiver is implied
from its acquiescence in the defendant's acts.
"If the defendant was not satisfied with the
terms of the gr.ant it could have refused to accept it.... The defendant in going ahead under
the ordinance also took its chance, and it cannot
be heard to say now that the charge was too high."
Postal Tel. Cable Co. vs. City of Newport, 169 S.W.

700.
The same issue was involved here as in the next
preceding case. The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, Postal Tel. Cable Co. vs.
City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 62 Law Ed. 1215, where
the court said :
"We assume if the first New York company
did at the outset accept the ordinance, either
in writing, according to its terms, or by erecting
poles and wires and occupying the streets thereunder, or in any other manner satisf.actory to
the city, that company and its successors in the
ownership of the telegraph system, including defendant, are bound to comply with the terms of
the ordinance as to the special license tax so long
as they continue to retain and enjoy the privileges
conferred."
City R Co. vs. Citizens Street R Co., 166 U.S. 557.
41 L. ed. 1114:

"This ordinance is also attacked upon the
ground that it was never formally accepted by
the company. There is really nothing in this contention. No formal resolution of the acceptance
is necessary in any case, if the facts show an
actual, pr.actical acceptance by the company, or
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action which would be only explicable in case
the amendment were accepted. There are two circumstances in this case, either of which is sufficient to constitute an acceptance.
"Mr. Johnson, the manager of the road, who
desired the extension of the charter, applied for
an amendment making the original section 15
read forty five years instead of thirty years and
in that connection says: 'After a good deal of
argument I was finally forced to concede to the
wishes of the committee, and they recommended
to the council an ordinance making it read 'thirty
seven years,' instead of the 'forty-five' we applied for. This ordinance was consented to in committee, and afterwards agreed to with the council,
as the best we could do under the circumstances.'
This was sufficient, as it is universally held that
a previous request for an ordinance obviates the
necessity of a subsequent acceptance. Atlanta vs.
Gate City Gaslight Co. 71 Ga. 106; Illinois River
R. Co. vs. Zimmer, 20 ill. 65-1: Lincoln & K Bank
vs. Richardson, 1 ~Ie. 79 (10 Am. Dec. 34) State,
Carlton, vs. Dawson, 22 Ind. 272; X ewton Ys.
Carbery~ 5 Cranch, C. C. 632; Perkins vs. Sanders, 56 :Miss. 732, 739: 1 ~Iorawetz, Priv. Corp.
Sec. 23.
·· \Ve are also of opinion that an acceptance
may be presumed fron1 the fact that the ainendment was beneficial to the corporation."
The authorities also hold, .as stated in 6 JlcQuillan
M1tnicipal Corporations, Sec. 20.12, Page 27:

"One who accepts .an ordinance and treats
it as in force for a period of years n1ay, under
the circu1nstances, be precluded fron1 challenging
its validity."
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This is true even though the license granted was
ultra vires, though not against public policy. In support
of this proposition, we cite the following:
Chicago Gen. Ry. Co. vs. City of Chicago, 176 Ill.
253, 52 N.E. 880.

A suit to collect a mileage tax imposed by the franchise ordinance. The court says:
"'Ve are also of the opinion that, even though
it might be held that the condition upon which
the permit or license was granted to the defendant railway company was ultra vires, the city not
having the power to impose it, nevertheless, the
ordinance having been accepted by the company
with the condition attached, agreeing thereby to
perform it, it became a valid contract between it
and the city, the validity of which the defendant
is now estopped to deny. The act of the city in
imposing. the condition cannot be treated as
against public policy or prohibited by statute,
and void, and therefore, having accepted the contract in its entirety and enjoyed the benefits for
which it agreed to pay the amount prescribed, it
cannot now repudiate that contract. Kadish vs.
Association, 151 Ill. 531, 38 N.E. 236; Cook Co. vs.
City of Chicago, 158 Ill. 524, 42 N.E. 67; City
of Fulton vs. Northern Illinois College, 158 Ill.,
333, 42 N .E. 138."
City of Springfield vs. Central Union Tel. Co. 184
Ill. App. 400.

The court says:
"The ordinance having been accepted, neither
the grantees nor their assigns may be permitted
to repudiate any of the terms and conditions that
are not contrary to public policy or prohibited
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by statute. Having accepted it became a valid
contract in its entirety."
Brattleboro vs. Town of Brattleboro, 173 A. 209,
................Vt..................
The court says:
"One who accepts an unconstitutional legislative enactment and treats it as in force for
years cannot be heard to question its validity.
Nor can he challenge such enactment on the
ground that it is discriminatory."
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ALL OBJECTIONS TO
THE VALIDITY OF SAID ORDINANCE AND IS BOUND
BY ITS TERMS AND I.S ESTOPPED TO QUESTION ITS
VALIDITY.

The facts as contained in the answer and admitted
by plaintiff clearly show that plaintiff has always regarded the ordinance as valid and binding in all its
terms. It has complied with and performed all its terms.
It has filed with the City Treasurer quarterly reports
of gross revenue, together with a computation of the
tax to be paid. It has permitted the city to verify such
reports by giving .access to its books. It has petitioned
and accepted a modification of the terms of the franchise ordinance. It has reported to the Public Service
Commission that it was bound to pay the license tax
and included that license tax as an item of expense in
justification for a raise in its fares. The Public Service Commission, at plaintiff's instance, considered the
tax as a legal and recurring expense and granted a
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raise in fares based upon such expense, which raise is
still in effect. The people of Salt Lake City have been
paying these increased fares since 1farch 17, 1954 and
will continue to pay them indefinitely in the future.
By plaintiff's own acts and actions the people of this
City have been, .and now are, paying these taxes through
the medium of paying increased fares. The officers of
the plaintiff agreed orally to the increase in the license
tax from lj2 of 1% to 2%, and upon such agreement
the ordinance was adopted, notwithstanding the ordinance then in force still had four years to run. The plaintiff has been operating motor buses exclusively sinee
1947, but has, nevertheless, complied with the terms of
the original ordinance and the ordinance of 1951 and
has never at any time asserted that the change to motor
transportation or otherwise worked an avoidance of the
franchise or authorized it to operate without a franchise.
As stated in Salt Lake City vs. Utah Light and
Traction Company, 52 Ut. 210, 153 P. 556:
"Where the controversy has arisen between
the contracting parties merely, and in ordinary
actions and procedings, the courts have usually
cornpelled compliance with the ordinance treating
them as contracts."
Under the conception that this ordinance is a contract which it in legal effect is, it is inconceivable that
the plaintiff can now successfully assert, in the face of
the facts above stated, that it has not waived the mere
formality of filing a written acceptance of the ordinance,
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14:
and is not estopped to deny that it has entered into a
contract with Salt Lake City governing its right to use
the city streets for the prosecution of its business. As
stated by the court in the case of Chicago General Railway Company vs. City of Chicago, supra.
"The ordinance having been accepted by the
company with the condition attached, agreeing
thereby to perform it, it became a valid contract
between it and the city, the validity of which
the defendant is estopped to deny."
The authorities cited by plaintiff do not involve contracts between the parties involved and the city by the
terms of which the parties agreed to pay the city a
license tax and so are not in point.
POINT III
BY IMPOSING THE LICENSE TAX UPON PLAINTIFF
BUT NOT UPON OTHER TYPES OF MOTOR CONVEYANCES THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND LACK OF UNIFORMITY
IN RESPECT TO CLASS AS CONTENDED BY PLAINTIFF.

The rule is stated in 7 5 A.L.R. Page 26 as follows:
"With one exception, hereinafter noted ("'\\:eimar Stor.age Co. vs. Dill (1928) 103 N.J. Eq. 307,
143 A tl. 438, infra), the courts which have passed
upon the question have uniformly held that motor
busses or jitneys operating as common carriers
of passengers between fixed tennini or over regular routes are the proper subject of a separate
classification, and that a state 1nay, without denying the equal protection of the laws, subject such
motor busses or jitneys to a tax, and exempt
therefrom all other kinds of motor carriers."
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We refer the court to the cases there cited and quoted
from. Typical of the views expressed by the courts is
the following from Allan vs. Bellingham 95 Wash. 12,
163 P. 18, involving an ordinance which defines .a jitney
bus to mean and include "every motor propelled vehicle
not operated on tracks, used in the occupation of carrying persons for hire, operating on any street for the
purpo.se of affording a means of transportation along
any street similar to that afforded by street railways,
by indiscriminately accepting and discharging within
the limits of the city such persons as may offer themselves for transportation for hire along the ways or
cours~s on which such vehicle is used or operated, or
may be running."
The court says:
"The record does not disclose the character
of the business conducted by the other kinds of
common carriers enumerated by the appellant,
and, of course, the court has only such knowledge
of the matter as is possessed by the generality
of mankind. In so far as we are advised, we think
there is a wide distinction between the class of
business done by jitney busses and that done by
the other carriers named. Street cars are so far
distinct as to be in a class by themselves, and
any regulation applicable to a jitney bus could
hardly be applicable to their situation. Auto stages
operate on regular schedules between fixed points,
usually between one city or town and another.
Auto busses and horse carriages ordinarily carry
passengers between given points, usually to and
from depots, docks or other landings, and hotels.
Sightseeing automobiles are operated more in the
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nature of private conveyances than as public carriers, and their business bears no relation to the
busines.s of a jitney bus. Taxicabs, livery rigs,
and the like operate from fixed stands and are
put into use on hire. The jitney bus differs from
each of these. It is operated continuously upon
the streets, usually in the most congested parts,
soliciting and taking up passengers wherever they
can be found. It is never for hire at all; all that
is offered is a seat and an opportunity to ride
to some point within the limit of its operations.
Its unrestricted use is fraught with danger, not
only to the passenger it carries, but to others
using the streets for their own purposes. Being
a common carrier, it is a subject of regulation,
and we are constrained to believe that its business is such as to make it subject of separate
classification. This being true, the city council
of a municipality may lawfully exact regulations
applicable to its business which it does not make
applicable to the business of other common carriers, without violating either of the constitutional
provisions before cited.
"::Municipal ordinances regulating the jitney
traffic as a class apart from other cmmnon ca.!"riers have been enacted in many of the principal
cities of our sister states. These, in so far as
we are advised, have been uniformly upheld by
the highest courts of such states against attacks
on the ground that they violated the equal protection and due process of law clauses in the
Federal Constitution, and the provisions directed
against class legislation in the Constitution of the
individual states. Some of the cases are the following : City of Memphis vs. State ex rei. Ryals,
133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. ,V. 631., L.R.A. 1916B, 1151;
Ex parte Bogle (Tex. Cr. R.) 179 S.,V. 1193;
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Huston vs. City of Des :Moines (Iowa) 156 N.W.
883; Ex Parte Dickey (W. Va.) 85 S.E. 781,
L.R.A. 1915F, 840: Thielke vs. Albee, 79 Or. 48,
153 Pac. 793; Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150
Pac. 348, L.R.A. 1915F, 850; Hazelton vs. City of
Atlanta, 144 Ga. 775, 87 S.E. 1043; Auto Transit
Co. vs. Forth Worth (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S.W.
685."
This case is referred to in Texas Co. vs. Cohn, 112
P. 2d 522 as follows :
"In Allen vs. Bellingham, the validity of an
ordinance of the city of Bellingham, which placed
a license, or occupation tax, upon the owners of
jitney busses, was challenged. This court held that
the ordinance did not violate the Federal or State
Constitutions, although operators of auto stages,
sight-seeing automobiles, taxicabs, and street cars,
manifestly in competition with jitney busses, were
not subject to the tax."
Dickey vs. Davis 76 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A.
1915 F. 840.

"* * * But, as regards unusual and extraordinary
rights respecting public properties, its power of
control and regulation is much more extensive.
Such rights are in the nature of concessions by
the public, wherefore the legislature may give or
withhold them at its pleasure. It may give them
for some purposes and withhold them for others,
and in the case of those given, it may, upon considerations of character, quality, and circumstances, discriminate, permitting some things of
a general class or nature to be done and refusing
to permit others of the same general class to be
done, or extending the privilege to some persons
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and denying it to others because of differences
of character or capacity.
The right of a citizen to travel upon the
highway and transport his property thereon in
the ordinary course of life and business, differs
radically and obviously from that of one who
makes the highway his place of business and uses
it for private gain, in the running of a stage coach
or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary
right of a citizen,-a common right, a right common to all; while the latter is special, unusual
and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent o.f
legislative power is that of regulation; but, as
to the latter, its power is broader; the right may
be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some
and denied to others, because of its extraordinary
nature. This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the
authorities."
1

"

See also 75 A.L.R. Page 30 where it is said:
"And the fact that taxicabs are exempted
from or not subject to a tax imposed upon jitneys
or n1otor buses operating over regular routes or
between fixed termini, or on a plan similar to
that followed by street railways, does not render
the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, since
the classification is a reasonable one."
See also Prick rs. City of Gary, 135 X.E. 346, 192
Ill. 76: .Jackie Cab Co., et a1, rs. Ch icapo Park District
9 N.E. 2<1 213, 366 Ill. -t-7-±; Tu.fl.qlc rs. Parket·, 156 P.

2d 533, 159 l(an. 57:2; Cent ra1 Grcylwund Lines rs.
Greyhound Cab CorJJ. 81 N.Y.S. 2d 416: Jarrell ts.
Orlando Transit Co., 167 So. 664, 123 Fla. 77G: Postal
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Tel. Cable Co. rs. City of Newport, supra; State vs.
Black Hills Trans. Co. 20 N.vV. 2d 683, -------------------- S.D.
In Slater vs. Salt Lake City, 115 Ut. 476, 206 P.
2d 153, 9 AL.R. 2d 712, this court stated the fundamental principles now under discussion as follows:
"Discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the constitution only
when the basis upon which it is founded is :unreasonable. In fixing the limits of the class, the
legislative body has a wide discretion and this
court may not concern itself with the wisdom or
policy of the law. Our function is to determine
whether an enactment operated equally upon all
persons similarly situated. If it does then the
discrimination is within permissable legislative
limits. If it does not, then the differentials would
be without reasonable basis and the act does meet
the test of constitutionality."
As stated in Dickey vs. Davis, stttpra, that the plaintiff "has no natural right to maintain upon a public highway a vehicle for the carriage of passengers for hire is
unquestionable." Further, it is clear that the city violates
no rule of uniformity, or of unfair discrimination, in
requiring of plaintiff conditions including the payment
of the 2% of its gross revenue, for permission to use
its streets, not required of other types of transporters
of passengers.
Plaintiff's buses are designed to accommodate mass
transportation. The wear and tear on the streets by such
vehicles making many runs per day over fixed routes
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is heavy. By the terms of the ordinance plaintiff has the
right to maintain coach stop signs upon the street signs
maintained by the city. Also the city furnishes sand
and salt for use by the plaintiff when water, snow or
ice impairs the normal traction. Further the plaintiff
is permitted to maintain benches on the street for the
accommodation of its customers. Special loading and
unloading places are provided and traffic generally is
directed away from the same so as to not interfere with
plaintiff's operations. These special incidents to the
use of the streets are not afforded to the public, nor
to other carriers of passengers. Clearly plaintiff is in
a class which entitles the city to legislate as to it without being guilty of class legislation or unfair discrimination.
POINT IV
SALT LAKE CITY HAS POWER TO LEVY THE FRANCHISE TAX IMPOSED BY SAID ORDINANCE.

While the statutes do not expressly grant to the
City the power to grant a franchise for the operation
of a mass transportation systen1 over its streets within
its boundaries, silnilar to the transportation provided
by a street railway s~-stem, they do giYe the city plenary
power over its streets. Section 10-8-8, U.C.A. 1953, empowers the city to •'lay out, establish, open, alter, widen,
narrow, extend, gradE>, pave or othenvise improve streets,
alleys, avenues, boulevards . . . . and 1nay vacate the
same or parts thereof by ordinance." Section 10-8-11,
U.C.A. 1953 provides that it "1nay regulate the use of
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streets, alleys, avenues ... " Section 10-8-39 empowers
a city to license, tax and regulate stages and buses,
etc. Section 10-8-80 authorizes the levying of a license
tax or fee upon any business for revenue.
As stated in Schoenfield vs. City of Seattle, 265 F.
726:
"The plaintiff purposes to utilize public
streets of a city for a special purpose and private
gain, .a right not common to all. As to such the
Washington court, in Allan vs. Bellingham
(supra) said: 'The power of the city as to such
u.sers of the streets is entirely plenary.'"
In Consolidated Coach Corp. vs. Kentucky River
Coach Co., 249 Ky. 65, 60 S.W. 2d 127, the court said:
"The streets and highways belong to the
public. They are built and maintained at public
expen.se for the use of the general public in the
ordinary and customary manner. The state, and
the city ,as an arm of the state, has absolute control of the streets in the interest of the public.
No Private individual or corporation has a right
to use of the streets in the prosecution of the
business of a common carrier for private gain
without the consent of the state, nor except upon
the terms and conditions prescribed by the state
or municipality, as the case may be."
Under a statute authorizing ordinances for the general welfare and proper government of the city the court,
in Clem vs. LaGrange 149 S.E. 638, 169 Ga. 51, 65 A.L.R.
1361, stated :
"Individuals do not have the inherent right
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to conduct their private businesses in the streets
of a city. A city can prohibit the owners or operators of taxicabs and busses from tr.ansporting
passengers for hire in such vehicles upon the
streets of the city. The transportation of p~ssen
gers for hire in such vehicles or otherwise is a
privilege which the municipality can grant or
withhold. As the owners or operators of taxicabs
or jitney busses have no right to transport passengers for hire on the streets of the city, and
as the city can prohibit wholly or partially the
conduct of such business in its streets, if the
city sees fit to grant permission to individuals
to conduct such business in its streets, it can
prescribe such terms and conditions as it may
see fit, and individuals desiring to avail themselves of such permission must comply with such
terms and conditions, whether they are reasonable
or unreasonable. Schlesinger vs. Atlanta, 161 Ga.
148, 129 S.E. 861."
2d 520 involved transportation

b~.,.

~Iiss.

180, 70 So.
motor bus. The court

Payne vs. Jackson City Lines, 220

said:
"The streets and highways, built and maintained at public expense, belong to the public, and
no private individual or corporation has a right
to use then1 for con1n1ercial purposes for private
gain without the consent of the state of municipality involved."

We quote the following fr01n Su!dreth vs. City of
Charlottc, 27 S.E. 2d 650, 223 N.C. 629:
"The business of carrying passengers for hire
is a privilege, the licensing of which is peculiarly
and exclusively a legislative preprogative. So is
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the power to regulate the use of public roads and
streets.
"Generally, under the powers conferred upon
them by their charters, or by general statute,
municipal corporations may impose reasonable
conditions upon the use of the streets by jitneys,
taxicabs, motor busses, or other motor vehicles
operating as common carriers in the transportation of passengers or freight. (Blashfield Auto.
Law & Proc. Perm Ed. p. 81, Sec. 105, see note
19 for authorities.)
"This power exists not only under the licensing authority of the municipality but also under
its recognized power to regulate the use of its
streets in the interest of public safety and convenience, and it is generally held that a municipality in the exercise of this power may prohibit
the use of the streets for private business or
other purpose detrimental to the common good.
3 McQuillan Mun. Corp. (2d) Revised, 216, Sec.
989; State vs. Caster, supra; Blashfield Cyc. Auto.
Law & Prac. Perm. Ed. Sec. 78, p. 67; City of
New Orleans vs. Calamari, 150 La. 739, 91 So.
172, 22 A.L.R. 106; Henderson vs. Bluefield, 98
W. Va. 640, 127 S.E. 492, 42 A.L.R. 279, Anno.
p. 282.
"It was never contemplated that the highways should form a part of the capital stock of
common carriers engaged in the tran.sportation
of persons or property for profit, or that the use
of the highways should be donated to them for
that purpose.
"Clearly, these companies have no vested or
inherent right in the highways, and their unrestrained use thereof is equivalent to an appropriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ation of public property for private use, and it is
within the power of the Legislature to prohibit
this use or to prescribe the terms upon which i.t
may be exercised.
"Where the power to regulate, license and
control motor vehicles for hire is vested by the
Legislature in the City ·Council, there is a broad
presumption in favor of the validity of an ordinance undertaking to exercise such power, and he
who attacks it must show affirmatively that it
is not expressly authorized by statute or that it
is, as applied to him, unreasonable and oppressive.
"The municipality may name such terms and
conditions as it see.s fit to impose for the privilege
of transacting such business, and the courts cannot hold such terms unreasonable except for discrimination between persons in a like situation."
This court in Slater t·s. Salt Lake City, 115 Ut. 476,
206 P. 2d 153, 9 A.L.R. 2d 712, quoted this language
from Ex parte ~lares, 75 Cal. App 2d 798, 171 P. 2d
762:
" 'The place for the conduct of a private business is upon private property; and it has been
said that there is no vested right to do business
upon the public streets.' Pittsford vs. City of Los
Angeles, 50 Cal. App 2d 25, 32, 122 P 2d 535,
538, .and .see text therein quoted and cases cited.
'It is well established law that the highways of
the state are public property; ... .and that their
use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, generally, at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit (citations).' Stephenson vs. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 264:,
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53 S Ct 181, 184, 77 L ed 288, 294, 87 ALR 721.
'Use of a public street for private enterprise may
under some circumstances rebound to the public
good; but nevertheless it is a special privilege
peculiarly subject to regulation, and one which
may be granted on reasonable terms or entirely
withheld (citations).' People vs. Galena, 24 Cal
App Supp 2d 770,775,70 P 2d 724,727 ... Numerous authorities support these statements.'"
The court also quoted from Packard vs. Banton,
26-l: U.S. 140, 68 L ed 596, as follows:
"If the state determines that the use of streets
for private purposes in the usual and ordinary
manner shall be preferred over their use by common carriers for hire, there is nothing in the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent. The streets
belong to the public and are primarily for the
use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use
for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and, generally at least, may be prohibited
or conditioned as the Legislature deems proper

"
The case of Pine Bluff vs . ..A_rkansas Traveler Bus
Co., 171 Ark. 727, 285 S.\V. 375, stated the rule as follows:
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the
streets and transport his property thereon in
the ordinary course of things is wholly different
from that of a common carrier, who makes the
streets his place of business and uses them for
private gain in the running of motor busses. The
former is the common right of everyone, and the
latter is a special or exceptional use of the streets,
not common to all citizens of the state."
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We contend that under the statutes above quoted
and the rule of law enunciated by the foregoing cases the
city has the power to impose special terms upon all
persons using its streets for the business of common
carrier, and that such terms may be evidenced by and
form a franchise ordinance adopted by the city.
Section 54-2-1 (12) defines the term "automobile
corporation" as including every corporation and person
engaged in or transacting a business of transporting
passengers by means of automobiles or motor stages on
public streets. Subsection 14 defines a common carrier
as including an automobile corporation. Section 54-4-25
(1) requires every automobile corporation to obtain a
certificate from the Public Service Commission. Subsection (3) provides that every applicant for such a
certificate shall file satisfactory evidence to show that
.such applicant has received the required consent, franchise or permit of the proper county, city, municipal
or other public authority.
This court in Union Pacific R. Co. vs. Public Service
Commission, 103 Ut. 186, 134 P 2d 469 refers to Section
54-4-25 (3), and holds that a railroad could not occupy
any streets of a eity without the consent of the city and
that such consent was required under the Public Utilities
Act.

In People vs. Public Sen·ice Commission, 174 N.E.
637, 255 N.Y. 232, the act required tl1e applicant for
a certificate to show that it had "reeeived the required
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consent of the proper municipal authorities." The court
said:
"Under this statute a consent presently operative that the petitioner occupy the highway is
a condition precedent to a certificate of approval."
In Sylvania Bttses vs. City of Toledo, 160 N.E. 674,
118 Ohio St. 187, the plaintiff obtained certificates from
the Public Utilitie.s Commission in 1923. In 1925 the
Utilities Law was amended requiring motor transportation companies to obtain consent of the municipal corporation. The City of Toledo, by ordinance, prohibited
the transportation of passengers over routes served by
a traction company and required a permit from the city
to transport passengers for hire. The city threatened
to enforce the ordinance and plaintiff sued to enjoin
the city from interfering with the operation of its motor
buses. The court held the certificates held by plaintiff
did not constitute a franchise nor a contract. "A permission granted by the certificate to operate upon the public
highways could not invest plaintiff in error with the
right to use the public streets for his private business."
It was only a license and could be revoked.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Legislature, in enacting the Public Utilities Act, did not intend
to take away any of the powers otherwise granted to
cities to control the use of their streets. On the contrary,
such control was specifically recognized and the Act
made subject thereto.
Plaintiff cites Utah Light and Traction Company vs.
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Public Service Commission, 118 P 2d 683, 101 Utah 99
as being conclusive that the city had no power to require a franchise of the plaintiff and to impose conditions therein not applicable to other users of the streets.
An analysis of that case shows the following: The
Utah Light and Traction Company, which had a franchise from Salt Lake City to operate a mass transportation system over the city's streets, protested before
the Public Utilities Commission the application of "Airways" for .a certificate to "render service as a common
carrier of passengers between Salt Lake City and some
9 smaller communities in the south end of Salt Lake
City,'' a wholly interurban operation. The question of
operating a bus system within Salt Lake City, Wholly
intraurban was not involved. The Traction Company
raised the objection that "Airways" had not .shown it
had the consent of the county, municipal or city authorities. Contrary to what counsel states in his brief, page
20, ("it ("Airways") had no franchise from Salt Lake
City to conduct that portion of its operation which was
conducted within Salt Lake City,") the court states:
"The evidence showed that Airways had a
franchise in Salt Lal\:e CitY where it had some
local intracity routes; that it had consent and
permission of l\Iurray City ... and it had made
arrange1nents for all necessary franchises in all
towns where it proposed to operate."
There was no evidence or contention that Airways was
going to operate an intraeity systen1 in any of the comrnunities named. As to S.alt Lake City it already had
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such a franchise. It was seeking a certificate to
operate an intercity line, from 9 communities to Salt
Lake City, something wholly different from an intracity mass transportation system over designated streets,
or fixed routes and termini, taking on passengers anywhere it desired along such routes.
vVhile the court uses language, as quoted in plaintiff's brief, which seems to limit the city's power to require franchises, we earnestly submit that such language
is not only not decisive of the question here involved; but
as to such question, if it has any applicability at all, is
wholly dictum. 'The essence of the court's decision w,as
that "there is no power granted to require or grant a
franchise for the use of the streets and highways for
the purpose of travel thereon as used by the public
generally ... it (Airways) uses the streets only for the
purpose of travel and transport in the s,ame manner as
the public generally. It is a business not subject to franchise requirements."
With such conclusion we do not disagree. In bringing
its passengers into Salt Lake City, Airways would be
operating the same as a farmer or tradesman in bringing
his products or goods into the city. The streets would
not be a part of its capital or its pl,ace of bu.siness, as
is the case with plaintiff.
The essence and real effect of the decision in this
case is stated in Union Pacific R. Co. vs. Public Service
Commission, supra, as follows:
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"In Utah Light & Traction Co. vs. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P. 2d 683,
689, we defined the term 'franchise' 'as • * • the
privilege of doing that which does not belong to
the citizens generally by a common right'; and
we pointed out that the right to lay rail is a
special privilege within the purview of that definition and therefore a proper subject of grant
by franchise. We added that franchis~ ,. • • are
required only in cases in which it is sought to
impose upon the street a special burden which
cannot be imposed generally, that is, to burden
the street with a special privilege which the public
generally may not likewise enjoy.' We concluded,
that since the application in that case was by
an automobile corporation for the operation
through certain cities as a common carrier by
automobile, and since automobiles do not burden
cities with rails or otherwise in a special manner,
but only in the same manner as the public generally, that the applicant was not subject to franchise requirements. In other word.s, cities and
towns have the power conferred upon them to
grant franchises for the use of their streets where
such use necessitates the burdening of the street
for the duration of the franchise with some physical instru1nentalitv such as railwaY tracks or
trolley poles, as distinguisl1ed froni a general
power to control the use of their streets where
such use is merely such as is enjoyed by the public in comn1on. Certainly, in the case last cited,
this court recognized the power of citie.s to grant
franchises, within the scope of the definition of
that term therein contained, and did not regard
that power as repealed by the Public {Ttilities Act,
or otherwise."
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That streets can be burdened by a special use, not
open to the public generally, without putting some kind
of a structure on them, such as poles, wires, rails, etc.,
is abundantly clear from the authorities heretofore cited.
It is .also clear, from the language of these two Utah
cases, that where the use of the streets is special the
city has the right to require a franchise.
In Shortino vs. Salt Lake and U. R. Co. 174 P.
860, 52 Ut. 476, it was contended that the town of Salem
did not have power by ordinance to fix a speed limit
governing cars of .an interurban railroad. Article 12,
Section 8 of the Utah Constitution is quoted as follows:
"No law shall be passed granting the right
to construct and operate a street railroad, telegraph, telephone or electric light plant within any
city or incorporated town, without the consent of
the local authoritie.s who have control of the street
or highway proposed to be occupied for such
purposes."
The court says :
"If it were held, however, that the foregoing
provision did not apply to defendant's interurban
railroad, yet the authorities of the town of Salem
clearly had the right to grant or withhold the
right to the use of the streets in the town, and
thus to impose conditions respecting the use
thereof for purpose.s other than the right of ordinary travel thereon."
In the case of Lewis vs. Utah State Tax Commission,
218 P. 2d 1074, 118 Ut. 72, this court had occasion to
review the cases in which the term "street railway" or
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"street railroad" was involved. It was there pointed
out that this term may have a different connotation in
various statutes, depending on the purpose to be aecomplished. It is there pointed out that a street railway
may be considered as not only a rail bound system but
also a non rail bound street transportation system, and
so those words could be descriptive of a street transportation system without rails.
We contend that the provisions of the constitution
quoted in the Shortino case, supra, should be so construed as to include under the term street railroad, any
mass transportation system which performs the same
function as a street railroad and uses the streets for that
purpo.se. That provision was drawn when motor buses
were unknown. The framers used the term then applicable to a mass street transportation system. It is inconceivable that they intended that consent of the city
should be obtained if the streets are to be used by one
kind of system but would not be required if some other
system should con1e into use to replace the then known
system.
The case of Peoples Transit Co. rs. Louisville Ry.
Co. 295 S.,V. 1055, 220 I~y. 728, discusse.s this very question. Here the street railway c01npany sought to enjoin
a bus line from operating on the city streets of Louisville without -a franchise. One of the constitutional provisions involved was sin1ilar to ours, u.sing the words
"street railway." The court argued that such words
should be interpreted in the light of the seiTires rendered,
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rather than upon the type of means used to render the
same, and so should be interpreted to mean a motor
bus type of transportation system. It was not necess'ary
to decide the case on that point, however, as the court
held that the "use of motor vehicles on public streets
and highways for the transportation of passengers between fixed termini, etc., is the exercise of a franchise,
there can be no doubt." It defines .a franchise as "a
privilege of doing that which does not belong to the
citizen of the country by common right.'' The court then
says:
"Cases from the highest courts of 23 states
besides Kentucky are cited in briefs, wherein it
was held that one engaged in the operation of
the busine.ss of a common carrier upon the public
highways by motor power and between fixed termini was exercising an extraordinary privilege
in the use of the traversed highways amounting
to a franchise, and in our opinion in the Harrison
Case, supra, will be found others by the Supreme
Court of the United States to the same effect.
There is, therefore, no room for the contention
that defendant, while engaged in the operation
of its bu.sses over the streets of Louisville in the
manner hereinbefore pointed out was not doing
so in the exercise of such a franchise as was and
is contemplated by Section 164, supra, of our
constitution."
We submit that, under the power to regulate the use
of its streets, and under its power to license and tax
any business for revenue purposes, the City has the
right to require that plaintiff, in operating its mass
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transportation system over the city street.s, obtain its
consent in the form of the franchise here involved, and
to impose a charge of 2% of plaintiff's gross revenue
in lieu of all taxes, levies and license taxes which might
otherwise be imposed, such charge being limited to the
gross revenue derived by plaintiff within the limits of
Salt Lake City.
CONCLUSION
In 1944 plaintiff sought for and obtained a franchise from Salt Lake City to operate a mass transportation system for carrying passengers over the street.s
of the city, by taking over the franchise then existing
in favor of the Utah Light and Traction Company.
Under that franchise it could operate either electric street
cars, electric trolley coaches or motor buses. Under the
franchise of February 27, 1951, the one under attack,
it still can operate the same kind of system. Since 1947,
a period of nine (9) years, plaintiff has fully recognized
and has acquiesed in, the city's power to grant a franchise to operate a n1otor bus transportation system over
its streets by complying with the tenns of both franchise.s. It agreed orally to increasing the charge to 2%
of it gross revenue as contained in the ordinance and
it has sought an increase in f·ares on the basis of such
charge. Tt ha.s aerepted ti1e benefits of both franchises.
It cannot now question the validity of either. Plaintiff
is in a class by itself such as pennits placing conditions
upon it not imposed upon other users of ti1e streets.
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The franchise charge is some compensation to the public
for the extraordinary use which plaintiff makes of the
public streets in conducting its business thereon. Plaintiff is thereby assisting, to some extent at least, in
the public burden of maintaining the streets. We respectfully submit that the franchise ordinance is valid
and that the city has the power to require payment to it
of the 2% gross revenue which plaintiff agreed to pay.
Judgment of the lower court should he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN
City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN,
Assistant City Attorney
414 City & County Building
Salt ·Lake City, Utah
.Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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